Home Ranch - A Single Family Residential Development in Gilroy, CA

Project Overview The purpose of this project was to provide a housing development plan for an undeveloped plot in the South Gilroy area. Project Statement The City of Gilroy needs additional housing to support the growth of their community. This project seeks to determine the best use of the undeveloped McCutchin Creek subplot and design its site layout. This plot of land is constrained by the City development codes, the 2023 City of Gilroy housing element, and the site specific development code. The deliverables presented to the client are a grading plan, site layout plan, stormwater and sewage plan, potable water, traffic assessment of development, and cost benefit analysis for the City

SIG-DB: leveraging homomorphic encryption to Securely Interrogate privately held Genomic DataBases

Genomic data are becoming increasingly valuable as we develop methods to utilize the information at scale and gain a greater understanding of how genetic information relates to biological function. Advances in synthetic biology and the decreased cost of sequencing are increasing the amount of privately held genomic data. As the quantity and value of private genomic data grows, so does the incentive to acquire and protect such data, which creates a need to store and process these data securely. We present an algorithm for the Secure Interrogation of Genomic DataBases (SIG-DB). The SIG-DB algorithm enables databases of genomic sequences to be searched with an encrypted query sequence without revealing the query sequence to the Database Owner or any of the database sequences to the Querier. SIG-DB is the first application of its kind to take advantage of locality-sensitive hashing and homomorphic encryption to allow generalized sequence-to-sequence comparisons of genomic data.Comment: 38 pages, 3 figures, 4 tables, 1 supplemental table, 7 supplemental figure

Gyroscopically Stabilized Oscillators and Heat Baths

In this paper we analyze the stability of a gyroscopic oscillator interacting with a finite- and infinite-dimensional heat bath in both the classical and quantum cases. We consider a finite gyroscopic oscillator model of a particle on a rotating disc and a particle in a magnetic field and we examine stability before and after coupling to a heat bath. The heat bath is modelled in the finite-dimensional setting by a system of independent oscillators with mass. It is shown that if the oscillator is gyroscopically stable, coupling to a sufficiently massive heat bath induces instability even in the finite-dimensional setting. The key mechanism for instability in this paper is thus not induced by damping. The meaning of these ideas in the quantum context is discussed. The model extends the exact diagonalization analysis of an oscillator and field of Ford, Lewis, and O'Connell to the gyroscopic setting. We also discuss the interesting role that damping of Landau type plays in the infinite limit.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/45132/1/10955_2004_Article_481221.pd

16th Annual Environmental Law Institute

Materials from the 16th Annual Environmental Law Institute held by UK/CLE in May 2000

Misselling through Agents * Roman Inderst †

Abstract This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's "suitability" for the specific needs of customers. When structuring salesforce compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from "misselling" unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. When purchasing unfamiliar products, consumers often rely on information and advice provided by representatives of the seller. This creates the possibility of "misselling," the questionable practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer's specific needs. 1 This problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products, such as consumer electronics, auto repairs, medical services, and retail financial products including securities, pensions, insurance policies, and mortgages. An important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent, rather than directly. For example, financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers' particular circumstances and needs. The possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets, most notably for securities transactions. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, the major self-regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the United States) mandates that brokersdealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their (non-institutional) customers and to ensure that their recommendations are "suitable" to customers' financial situations and needs. 2 Firms that make unsuitable recommendations are sanctioned through FINRA disciplinary procedures. ' Standard Chartered Bank, 2005) reports the following apt illustration: "Typically, mis-selling is associated with investment products when there may have been a failure to disclose all the associated risks or where an investment product is inappropriate to a customer's needs. For example, a product with a long tenor [sic] (eg ten years) may have a guaranteed repayment of principal only on maturity date, but if prematurely liquidated it may not repay the full principal. This may result in mis selling if it is sold to customer who may have had a short term need for cash or to a customer who is 70 years old." 2 FINRA was formed in 2007 through a consolidation of the enforcement arm of the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Regulation, Inc., and the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD). NASD Conduct Rule 2310(a) 'Recommendation to Customers (Suitability),' originally adopted in 1939, prescribes: "In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." Added in 1991, Rule 2310(b) 'Broker's Duty of Inquiry' further requires: "Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a non-institutional customer, other than transactions with customers where investments are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning: (1) the customer's financial status; (2) the customer's tax status; (3) the customer's investment objectives; and (4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such member or registered representative in making recommendations to the customer." In addition, Rule 3010 imposes a duty of supervision on the firm employing the broker-dealer. 3 According to Lewis Lowenfels and Alan R. Bromberg (1999), "unsuitability claims are the most common and yet the most ambiguous of all customer claims." Regulatory bodies may, in addition, support customers who claim compensation. Such compensation can be substantial, as witnessed by recent highprofile misselling scandals following the liberalization of the U.K. financial industry in the 1980s. After a full review of private pension sales in 1994, financial institutions reportedly paid out a total compensation 1 This paper analyzes the possibility of misselling through the lens of the agency relationship between the selling firm and its salesforce. We argue that the risk of misselling is particularly acute when the firm hires the same agents to both prospect for new customers and provide product advice. When the firm provides steeper incentives-for example, because the presence of more firms makes it harder for agents to locate new customers-then agents will be more tempted to inflate the perceived value of the product, or to recommend purchase even if the product is inappropriate for the customers they identify. At the heart of our model lies a multi-task problem that is inherent to the practice of direct marketing. An agent who markets a product directly to customers must first prospect for potential customers and interest them in the product, and second advise customers on the suitability of the product (including the provision of accurate information). The incentives necessary to induce search effort subsequently tempt the agent to advise purchase indiscriminately. Firms that missell through their own employees may be held vicariously liable or may damage their reputation with customers. Similarly, when misselling takes place through independent intermediaries, firms risk being sued or facing regulatory sanctions (including loss of license). Therefore, firms should have a vital interest in ensuring that their agents comply with the chosen standard of advice. However, ensuring compliance is costly for the firm, as it may require internal reviews or result in rents for the agents. 4 Through the use of contingent commissions, which are clawed back in cases of alleged misselling or when dissatisfied customers cancel a contract, the resulting agency cost to the firm can be reduced. 5 We show that an agent's expected cost of prospecting for customers, the internal organization of a firm's sales process, and the transparency of the commission structure all affect the firm's own tolerance towards misselling. Importantly, it is only through the agency of £12 billion. Compensation is still being paid for the misselling of endowment mortgages, which bundle mortgages with risky investments. See also footnote 22. 4 Sellers can use a number of internal controls to monitor agents and to limit their discretion when making recommendations to customers. For example, sellers use internal compliance officers and Customer Relationship Management (CRM) systems to regularly audit their agents' "fact finds." The audit trail for the transaction allows the seller to monitor the agent's performance more easily and to resolve disputes over allegations of misselling. 5 In an extension of the baseline model, we show that agency costs may be limited further if advisers are relieved (to some extent) of the task of prospecting for customers (for example, when bank managers are only advising incoming clients in a bank's local branch, while client traffic is driven by the bank's marketing campaign). 2 relationship that these factors affect the potential for misselling. Casting the firm as an entrepreneurial entity instead-akin to a self-employed lawyer or doctor, as in the extant literature on credence goods-overlooks the role played by these factors. As we argue, this could be particularly problematic in evaluating the scope of possible policy intervention, say through imposing regulations or probing into cases of alleged misselling. In addition, while the presence of the internal agency problem strengthens the case for intervention, it also calls for policymakers and regulators to adopt a more fine-tuned approach-for example, by adapting their response to the organization of the sales process and the prevailing intensity of competition. In our model, the price of the product is determined endogenously. On the one hand, the suitability standard that customers expect to prevail affects the maximum price they are willing to pay. On the other hand, the price also affects the firm's incentives to expand sales by tolerating a lower suitability standard. Even though customers do not observe the agent's incentives in our baseline scenario, they have correct expectations in equilibrium about the commission structure and the resulting suitability standard. Given that the expectation of misselling reduces customers' willingness to pay, the firm would benefit ex ante from committing to pay ex post penalties for misselling. Firms might be able to achieve some commitment through self-regulatory organizations, such as FINRA. 6 However, we show that even when firms have the same commitment power as a policymaker, the suitability standard set under self-regulation is still too low from a welfare perspective. In addition to imposing penalties for misselling, regulators could mandate disclosure of the commissions paid to agents, as is becoming increasingly common in some countries and markets. 7 We show that the disclosure of commissions partly deters firms from lowering their standards. When observing that the firm offers less steep incentives to the agent, customers are reassured that the suitability standard has increased; hence, they are willing to pay more, to the benefit of the firm. As more financial decisions end up in the hands of consumers, for example with the shift from defined benefit pension plans to 401(k) plans in the United States, regula-6 While SEC regulation requires that all brokers-dealers belong to a self-regulatory organization, in other markets membership in such organizations is voluntary. For example, insurance brokers can apply for membership in the Insurance Marketplace Standards Association (IMSA), a voluntary self-regulatory organization active in setting and enforcing ethical standards for the sale of individual life insurance, long-term care insurance, and annuities. 7 See Section 6. 3 tors are grappling with the interaction between product providers, advising agents, and consumers-Howell E. Jackson's (2007) "trilateral dilemma." 8 As is common for the retailing of financial services, the U.S. mortgage industry also relies heavily on third-party agents. 9 In the context of our model, we analyze how agents' compensation and suitability standards change as firms resell contracts (such as loans)-a practice that is currently attracting regulators' attention. It remains to be seen how courts and policymakers will deal with the fallout from the recent turmoil in the subprime mortgage market. Beyond financial and insurance services, our model applies more broadly to situations in which marketing agents are tempted to inflate the perceived value of products. 10 For instance, a salesperson may praise certain features but hide others when trying to convince a client to switch to a particular calling plan, or utility contract, either of which may be sufficiently complex to make such deception successful. 11 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the related literature. Section 2 formulates the baseline model. Section 3 characterizes how the firm should optimally compensate the agent. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium that results when the customer does not observe the agent's compensation. Section 5 discusses the effect of agency on the equilibrium outcome and on the scope for policy intervention. Section 6 turns to the equilibrium when the agent's compensation scheme is transparent. Sections 7 to 9 extend the model to investigate the role of the internal organization of the sales process, the possibility of contract resale, and the effect of changes in the amount of competition for customers. Section 10 concludes. Appendix A presents a toy model of the 8 Legal scholars are paying increasing attention to the role of contingent commissions and premiums in the form of yield spread premiums to mortgage brokers, brokerage commissions in investment management, contingent insurance commissions, or fees and kickbacks in real estate settlement transactions. These commissions are feared to tempt advisors to "steer" clients to unsuitable products. See, for instance, Jackson and Laurie Burlingame (2007) and, with a particular focus on contingent commissions, Daniel Literature This paper contributes to the analysis of optimal compensation for a direct marketing agent who must be incentivized simultaneously to sell and not to missell. When analyzing the optimal compensation structure (salary and commission) for sales agents, the marketing literature has traditionally focused on the classic trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives (see Amiya K. Basu, Rajiv Lal, V. Our model hinges on the conflict between a sales agent's incentives to prospect for customers and to provide adequate advice. The compensation needed to elicit effort on one task (prospecting for customers) creates a conflict of interest between the firm and the agent on the second task (providing adequate advice). This conflict generates a multi-task agency problem Consideration of the firm's agency problem is novel to the literature on credence and experience goods, following Michael R. 14 In their analysis Hagerty By focusing on this agency problem, we highlight the two-way interaction between the internal organization of the sales process and the regulatory framework. 15 Model Consider a risk-neutral firm selling a single product through a risk-neutral agent who is asked to both prospect for customers and advise them. The agent is protected by limited liability, and hence can only receive positive compensation from the firm. By exerting sales effort at private disutility c S > 0, the agent contacts a potential customer with probability μ > 0. 16 16 Think of the agent as either contacting previous clients or prospecting for new customers. The cost c S may be required to make customers aware of the existence of the (possibly new) product. 6 In addition, the agent assists customers in deciding whether the product (or service) is suitable for their specific needs. To capture the uncertainty about the match between customer preferences and product characteristics, we stipulate that there are two customer types, θ = l, h. A customer of type θ derives utility u θ from acquiring the product, with u l < 0 < u h . 17 We allow for the firm's cost of serving the customer, k θ > 0, to be type dependent. 18 Given this specification, a sale made to a type-l customer results in both net loss for the customer and inefficiency from a welfare perspective. The prior probability that θ = h is given by 0 < q < 1, which is also the only information the customer has about the type. The agent privately observes a noisy presale signal s ∈ [0, 1] about the customer's type. 19 Without further loss of generality, we stipulate that s is realized according to the type-dependent distribution functions F θ , where F h dominates F l in the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) order. We assume that the densities f θ (s) are continuous and strictly positive in the interior s ∈ (0, 1), so that the posterior probability q(s) = Pr[θ = h | s] is strictly increasing. Assuming further that f h (1) > 0, f l (0) > 0, and f h (0) = f l (1) = 0, the signal is fully informative at the boundaries: q(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1. It is convenient to define F (s) as the unconditional distribution of the signal, with density f (s) : When contracting with the agent, the firm cannot condition directly on the agent's effort or the customer's type, because the firm does not observe them. Instead, the firm can condition the agent's compensation first on whether a sale has been made, and second on a post-sale signal about the customer's type. We specify that the post-sale signal reveals with probability 0 < ψ < 1 whether a sale was made to a type-l customer. For instance, the signal could originate from the complaints of disgruntled customers. In this case, ψ corresponds to the conditional probability with which a sale to a type-l customer results 17 Utilities are taken to be net of the respective next-best option. For instance, retail investment products may have a particular risk-return profile that is not optimal for all investors. Likewise, one product may create a particular tax advantage, though possibly at the cost of higher risk. 18 As discussed in more detail in Section 8, the firm's margin naturally depend on the customer's type for some financial products (such as mortgages or insurance contracts) and long-term service contracts (such as calling plans or utility services-cf. footnote 11). The condition k l > k h may have particular relevance for financial products such as mortgages (see footnote 47). The case with k l < k h may be applicable to insurance products, where type-h customers could represent high-risk customers, who are more likely to receive the contractually stipulated (pooling) indemnity. Finally, the case with k θ = k should apply to most physical goods. 19 Because this is not key to our analysis, we also specify for the moment that this information is available to the agent at no additional cost. See, however, Section 7. 7 in a verifiable complaint. 20 A key parameter in our model is the expected penalty, ρ, that the firm incurs from (mis)selling to a type-l customer. 21 This parameter captures the legal costs and the fines following prosecution for misselling, comprising compensation that must be made to customers. In addition, the firm may suffer a loss in reputation following alleged misselling. In regulated sectors, the firm may face the risk of losing its license, being brought under closer regulatory scrutiny, or being less able to successfully contest future disciplinary actions for alleged misconduct. 22 Note that because the signal s is noisy, even draconian punishment (high ρ) could not ensure that only type-h customers will purchase. Instead, because the firm can be sure to sell only to type-h customers if and only if s = 1, the firm would close down its business if ρ were sufficiently high. 23 We stipulate that a fraction 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 of ρ represents a compensatory transfer to the customer. All of our results hold irrespective of the choice of η. The timing is as follows: 1. The firm sets the product price, p. 2. The firm sets the compensation scheme for the agent. 3. The agent chooses whether to exert effort to prospect for a customer. 4. If the agent exerts effort, then a customer arrives with probability μ. 5. The agent privately observes signal s about the customer's type. 6. The agent advises the customer whether to purchase. 7. The customer decides whether to purchase at price p. 8. Conditional on a sale to a type-l customer, the firm observes a negative signal with probability ψ. 9. Conditional on a sale to a type-l customer, the firm pays an expected penalty ρ, a fraction η of which is rebated to the customer. A key building block of the model is the communication game between the agent and 20 In footnote 29 we argue that our results are robust to alternative specifications of the monitoring technology, provided that the post-sale signal is noisy. 21 The likelihood that disgruntled customers lodge complaints, or that sufficient information of alleged misselling surfaces, may be low. Still, ρ may be substantial if the imposed penalty is sufficiently large. 22 As explained by 8 the customer that takes place at stages 5-7. The agent's preferences depend on the firm's compensation scheme and thus will reflect the preferences of the firm. However, when k l + ρ ≤ k h holds, firm and customer interests are completely misaligned: the firm benefits (weakly) more when selling to type-l customers, while type-h customers benefit strictly more from a purchase. In this case, there is no equilibrium in which the customer follows the agent's advice. We therefore stipulate for now that k l + ρ > k h . 24 We will show that in this case the agent's recommendation results in the customer purchasing the product whenever s ∈ [s * , 1], where we refer to s * as the suitability standard. By choosing the compensation scheme at stage 2, the firm effectively induces the agent to implement a particular suitability standard. Following Grossman and Hart's (1983) twostage approach, Section 3 characterizes the firm's agency costs associated with any given suitability standard. Section 4 then turns to the determination of the optimal standard. 25 Agency Cost of Suitability This section characterizes the compensation scheme that induces a direct marketing agent to implement a given suitability standard s * . We show that to implement a suitability standard s * > 0, the seller must leave a positive rent to the agent-this rent corresponds to the agency costs associated with the standard. Incentive Constraints The agent is protected by limited liability and has an outside option wage of zero. As shown in Proposition 1, it is opti

American Society of Clinical Oncology/College ofAmerican Pathologists guideline recommendations forimmunohistochemical testing of estrogen andprogesterone receptors in breast cancer

Purpose: To develop a guideline to improve theaccuracy of immunohistochemical (IHC) estrogen receptor(ER) and progesterone receptor (PgR) testing in breastcancer and the utility of these receptors as predictivemarkers.Methods: The American Society of Clinical Oncologyand the College of American Pathologists convened aninternational Expert Panel that conducted a systematicreview and evaluation of the literature in partnership withCancer Care Ontario and developed recommendations foroptimal IHC ER/PgR testing performance.Results: Up to 20% of current IHC determinations ofER and PgR testing worldwide may be inaccurate (falsenegative or false positive). Most of the issues with testinghave occurred because of variation in preanalyticvariables, thresholds for positivity, and interpretationcriteria.Recommendations: The Panel recommends that ER andPgR status be determined on all invasive breast cancers andbreast cancer recurrences. A testing algorithm that relieson accurate, reproducible assay performance is proposed.Elements to reliably reduce assay variation are specified. It is recommended that ER and PgR assays be consideredpositive if there are at least 1% positive tumor nuclei in the sample on testing in the presence of expected reactivity of internal (normal epithelial elements) and external controls. The absence of benefit from endocrine therapy for women with ER-negative invasive breast cancers has been confirmed in large overviews of randomized clinical trials.(Arch Pathol Lab Med. 2010;134:907–922

Integration of oncology and palliative care : a Lancet Oncology Commission

Full integration of oncology and palliative care relies on the specific knowledge and skills of two modes of care: the tumour-directed approach, the main focus of which is on treating the disease; and the host-directed approach, which focuses on the patient with the disease. This Commission addresses how to combine these two paradigms to achieve the best outcome of patient care. Randomised clinical trials on integration of oncology and palliative care point to health gains: improved survival and symptom control, less anxiety and depression, reduced use of futile chemotherapy at the end of life, improved family satisfaction and quality of life, and improved use of health-care resources. Early delivery of patient-directed care by specialist palliative care teams alongside tumour-directed treatment promotes patient-centred care. Systematic assessment and use of patient-reported outcomes and active patient involvement in the decisions about cancer care result in better symptom control, improved physical and mental health, and better use of health-care resources. The absence of international agreements on the content and standards of the organisation, education, and research of palliative care in oncology are major barriers to successful integration. Other barriers include the common misconception that palliative care is end-of-life care only, stigmatisation of death and dying, and insufficient infrastructure and funding. The absence of established priorities might also hinder integration more widely. This Commission proposes the use of standardised care pathways and multidisciplinary teams to promote integration of oncology and palliative care, and calls for changes at the system level to coordinate the activities of professionals, and for the development and implementation of new and improved education programmes, with the overall goal of improving patient care. Integration raises new research questions, all of which contribute to improved clinical care. When and how should palliative care be delivered? What is the optimal model for integrated care? What is the biological and clinical effect of living with advanced cancer for years after diagnosis? Successful integration must challenge the dualistic perspective of either the tumour or the host, and instead focus on a merged approach that places the patient's perspective at the centre. To succeed, integration must be anchored by management and policy makers at all levels of health care, followed by adequate resource allocation, a willingness to prioritise goals and needs, and sustained enthusiasm to help generate support for better integration. This integrated model must be reflected in international and national cancer plans, and be followed by developments of new care models, education and research programmes, all of which should be adapted to the specific cultural contexts within which they are situated. Patient-centred care should be an integrated part of oncology care independent of patient prognosis and treatment intention. To achieve this goal it must be based on changes in professional cultures and priorities in health care

Radiation -induced instability.

Energy transfer between interconnected mechanical systems is important in many real world applications. When a finite dimensional system is coupled to an infinite dimensional system, energy can be radiated from the finite dimensional system and absorbed by the infinite dimensional system, which we call radiation damping. For example, satellites and space stations have a central rigid body which can radiate energy through flexible components such as solar panels and antennae. Radiation damping can also describe dissipation in a conservative context, where energy of one form (such as motion of a mechanical system) is transformed into energy of another form (such as heat) of a larger conservative system. An early physical model of radiation damping, investigated by Horace Lamb, describes an oscillator coupled to a string modeling free vibrations of a nucleus in an external medium. This system exhibits radiation damping via energy radiating from the oscillator into waves of the string that are carried off to infinity. We extend the Lamb model to a linear mechanical system with gyroscopic forces coupled to a wave equation. As energy radiates from this system into wave modes, the system can become unstable. Adding dispersion in the wave equation eliminates the mechanical system's access to low wave modes and allows a band of stability for small coupling. We focus on three types of coupling: the gyroscopic Lamb model, wave field coupling, and heat bath coupling. In the gyroscopic Lamb model, a system has a boundary constraint through which energy is transferred into the wave. In the wave field coupling, the mechanical system excites a wave field. In the heat bath coupling, the mechanical system is coupled to a collection of independent oscillators. We also study a class of mechanical systems intermittently coupled to a surface. Such intermittent coupling arises naturally when describing animal or robotic locomotion which have a stance phase and a aerial phase as part of their gait. Just as radiation damping destabilizing a relative equilibrium, intermittent contact can destabilize periodic motion of mechanical systems. As a example of intermittent coupling, we analyze the aerial and the stance phases of an inhomogeneous cylinder impacting a surface. We show the existence of periodic orbits with no energy loss and investigate their stability.Ph.D.MathematicsPure SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/125423/2/3016860.pd